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D E C 6 1975 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRIGUAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
J. Reuben Clark Law School 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
. vs. 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A. , 
Defendant and Appellant, 
vs. 
DON ALLEN, dba MOUNT NEBO CATTLE 
COMPANY, 
Intervenor, Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
J.B.J. FEEDYARDS, INC., a corpora-
tion; JOSEPH FORD & SONS, a 
partnership; JAMES K. FORD, WILLIAM 
FORD and WILLIAM G. BOSWELL, 
Involuntary Defendants. 
Pursuant to Rule 76(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Appellant FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A. respectfully petitions 
the Court to grant a rehearing in the above-entitled matter. The 
grounds for such rehearing are argued more fully in the attached 
Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing, but may be summarized 
as follows: 
Case No. 13725 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
F I L E D 
MAY 5-1975 
"ciw'CSupw"" Court, Utah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-2-
The Court erred in concluding that the trial court's 
findings were supported by substantial evidence with respect to: 
(a) The finding that 272 animals which had been attached 
by FIRST SECURITY*BANK belonged to intervenor; 
(b) The finding that the cattle in question were re-
ceived by Mr. GARTH BOSWELL as agent for the intervenor; and 
(c) The finding that ownership of the animals 
in question did not pass to J.B.J. FEEDYARDS. 
DATED this ~ \ • ' day of May, 1975. 
RAY, QUINNEY .& NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
By .-- rvi-^ .- ^^//£{c, ., 
Don B. Allen 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., 
Defendant-Appellant, 
et al. 
Case No. 13725 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS 
ON KEY ISSUES WERE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
A. INTERVENOR DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PARTICULAR CATTLE 
INISSUE'WERE UNDER HIS OWNERSHIP. 
Appellant can here focus on certain facts in the record or 
the absence of other material facts without lengthy argument. Ap-
pellant strongly urges that the Court reconsider its prior opinon 
by recognizing that intervenor did not present any material evidence 
in supporting the lower court finding that the specific animals in 
question here remained under his ownership. The only direct testi-
mony of Intervenor on the question consisted of his identification 
of certain brands and a few animals which he recognized as coming 
from some neighbors in Montana (Tr. 520, 1.2 and 521, 1. 22). This 
is so patently an unreliable conclusion because nearly all of the 
cattle which had been purchased by J.B.J. FEEDYARDS had come from 
intervener's purchases in Montana, and totaled approximately 3,200 
head between April, 1972 and January, 1973 (Exh. 74 and Tr. 759). 
It is only logical that some of the cattle remaining at the time 
of the dispute herein arose were cattle bearing brands recognized 
by intervenor. Yet, he admitted that during 1972 he sold some 
20,000 or 25,000 cattle and that he could not identify specific 
brands or specific cattle as having been shipped before or after 
January 1, 1973 (Tr. 509, 1.11 and 510, 1.19). This is very 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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critical! If intervenor could not identify the cattle in question 
as having been shipped after January 1, 1973 for his MOUNT NEBO 
cattle operation, then the cattle must of necessity have been cattle 
which were shipped earlier for J.B.J. FEEDYARDS. Intervenor did 
not introduce one shred of documentary evidence by which he could 
trace the 275 attached cattle here under consideration to any ship-
ments he made for his own account. Appellant respectfully urges 
that the total lack of evidence demonstrating that intervenor 
could relate his own shipment to the cattle sold by the parties 
pending this action requires that intervener's case fall. 
Appellant had some affirmative evidence before the Court 
which, in any event, completely dispelled any notion that the at-
tached cattle were those of intervenor. The Court must review 
again the impact of Exhibit 86 (received Tr. 864, 1.5). That ex-
hibit is the sum total of all records produced in discovery proceed-
ings by intervenor and respondent relating to shipment by inter-
venor for his MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY operation after January 1, 
1973. Hoping to render unnecessary the painstaking comparison 
by the Court, Appellant and its counsel made a meticulous comparison 
of the brands.from the cattle admittedly shipped by intervenor 
against brands on the attached cattle here in dispute (shown on 
Exhibit 11). Out of 267 head of cattle attached, only 12 animals 
had brands from Montana which duplicated any brands taken from 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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intervener's animals shown on Exhibit 86. In the face of such 
eivdence, we submit that the Court cannot believe the findings 
of the lower court supported by substantial evidence. The 12 
animals which do have similar brands are described on pages 59 
and 60 of Appellant's original brief and that description will not 
be repeated here. But we must emphasize that such evidence is uncon-
troverted and results in the inescapable conclusion that not more 
thai 12 attached animals could have belonged to intervenor (and 
those were not necessarily his, in view of the many Montana-originated 
shipments for J.B.J, which preceded the attachment). Speaking 
boldly, but respectfully, we defy counsel for intervenor or respondent 
to point to any other credible documentary evidence in the record 
which would overcome the conclusion above stated which we described 
as inescapable, and which would require reversal of this judgment. 
B. THE CATTLE IN QUESTION WERE NOT RECEIVED BY MR. BOSWELL 
AS AGENT FOR INTERVENOR. 
Among the attached cattle the only animals which could 
possibly have been received by Mr. BOSWELL as agent for intervenor 
were 74 head representing the much-disputed shipments of December 
15, 1972 and December 20, 1972. All other animals in question 
were received by J.B.J, priot to those dates and, except for ship-
ments of November 29 and December 12, were paid for! Mr. BOSWELL 
was at all times prior to January 1, 1973 an officer and agent 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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for J.B.J., and intervenor doesn't even claim that BOSWELL acted 
for intervenor prior to mid-December, 1972. Yet Boswell's own 
list of J.B.J, animals included the December 15 and 20 shipments 
as J.B.J, animals (Exhibit 33 and Tr. 424, 1.28). The record con-
tains no evidence whatever that any of the other animals were 
received by BOSWELL as agent for intervenor, and even the December 
15 and 20 shipments are highly questionable. It is clear that the 
loads were purchased by intervenor or his order buyers in Montana 
for sale to J.B.J, and were shipped to J.B.J, pursuant to standing 
orders (Tr. 471, 1.21 and 499, 1.1). It was thought that new 
financing for J.B.J, was pproved at the request of BOSWELL (Tr. 
499, 1.25, et seq.), and that the cattle would be paid for by 
J.B.J. (Tr. 500, 1.18). Clearly BOSWELL was acting for J.B.J, 
at those times and just as clearly, BOSWELL was acting for inter-
vener after January 1, 1973 for the cattle specifically consigned 
by MOUNT NEBO (Exhibit 86), but none of the cattle attached and 
under review here were traceable to any of those MOUNT NEBO ship-
ments. 
C. TITLE TO THE CATTLE PASSED TO J.B.J. FEEDYARDS. 
In approaching the oral testimony contained on the record, 
it has never been necessary to attack the credibility of intervenor; 
(his other chief witness, BOSWELL, was caught in a number of dis-
crepancies, but even his best testimony was not fully supportive 
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of intervener's position). Mr. ALLEN was forthright and, when 
he didn't know he said so, and when he was unsure, he admitted so. 
His more positive statements were helpful to Appellant. Of critical 
importance to the issue of passage of title is Mr. ALLEN's testimony 
regarding the effect of the "market clearances" from Montana as 
"bills of sale". He was unequivocal in describing Exhibits 39 and 
40, for example, which detailed the December 15 and 20 shipments 
totaling 74 head, as "bills of sale" (Tr. 556, 1.20 and 557, 1.20). 
The standard practice in Montana was to consider those documents 
as evidence of ownership of cattle (Tr. 530, 1.30). Thus the 74 
head mentioned in the December shipments should be construed as 
owned by J.B.J, pursuant to the bills of sale, especially since 
Mr. ALLEN admitted that Exhibit 33, BOSWELL's schedule of J.B.J, 
cattle, represented all of the cattle purchases of J.B.J, through 
December 20, 1972 (Tr. 504 and 505), irrespective of the nonpayment 
of four loads which were billed to J.B.J. (Tr. 506, 11.8 and 15). 
As to other loads of cattle designated for and shipped 
to J.B.J., Exhibits 31 and 32 represent further livestock market 
clearances which must operate as bills of sale. These documents 
further reflect the pattern of dealing by which bills of sale 
were used in connection with shipments of cattle to J.B.J., in-
cluding, we submit, those under consideration here, thus passing 
title even before payment for the shipments was made or demanded. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In other parts of the record, intervenor testified that 
when cattle shipments were initiated by him from Montana to J.B.J., 
a draft drawn on one of the banks for J.B.J, was frequently (but 
not always) made out and forwarded for collection. The actual 
shipment time for the cattle was 18-30 hours to Goshen, Utah, but 
the drafts required eight or ten days for clearance (DON ALLEN 
deposition pages 103, 105). In making such drafts on FIRST SECURITY, 
he knew of FIRST SECURITY'S lien on the cattle (DON ALLEN deposi-
tion, page 134). These facts are typical of the dealings described 
throughout all of the record by which the cattle arrived long 
before any payment was expected. Thus, any claim df "C.O.D." 
shipments is entirely unwarranted. Title passed to J.B.J, simply, 
in accordance with business practices, and .as a matter of law. 
The foregoing considerations, coupled with the additional 
fact that nowhere in the record does intervenor claim he reserved 
an express security interest in the shipped cattle pursuant to 
Section 70A-9-203 or 70A-2-705, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
combine to demonstrate why this court should hold that no substantial 
evidence appears for the conclusion of the lower court that title 
did not pass from DON ALLEN to J.B.J. On the contrary, we submit 
affirmatively that the substantial evidence denotes the passage of 
title to J.B.J, on all shipments. How can intervenor deny the effect 
of the bills of sale to J.B.J, which he or his order buyers caused 
to be submitted in connection with each shipment from Montana to 
J.B.J.? He cannot and did not so deny, according to the record 
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before this Court* 
II. THE SUPREME COURT HAS CLEAR POWER TO DISTURB FINDINGS OF THE 
LOWER COURT WHERE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE DOES NOT REASONABLY 
AND CLEARLY SUPPORT SUCH FINDINGS. 
It is unnecessary to engaged in semantical argument about the 
difference between "substantial" evidence and "weight" of the 
evidence. We have attempted to demonstrate why the Court should 
conclude that the key findings of the lower court were not sup-
ported by the record. The legal proposition here is well accepted. 
The Court has always recognized its inherent power to reverse and 
set aside a lower court judgment where the findings are insufficient 
or unsupported by the evidence, whether the case was tried to a 
judge alone (Utah Assn. of Credit Men v. Home Fire Ins. Co., 36 0. 
20, 102 P. 631 (1909), or even to a jury (Seybold v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Co., 121 U. 61, 239 P.2d 174 (1951). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant petitions the Court to grant a rehearing in 
the above-entitled case. The bulk of the record (and even of 
Appellant's first brief) perhaps obscured certain key issues and the 
facts supporting or not supporting certain findings. It is re-
spectfully submitted that a rehearing should result in alteration 
of the Court's opinion when another, sharper focus on such key 
facts is allowed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
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